Central intelligence agency
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Status report on the Greek, Turkish, Yugoslav


military alliance

Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia have agreed that the time has come to transform the tripartite Ankara Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (28 February 1953) into a formal military alliance. They are now working out the details.

Concurrently, representatives of the United States, Britain and France are formulating a united position on the proposed alliance and its implications for NATO. Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that "The parties agree that an armed attack against one...shall be considered an attack against all...if such an armed attack occurs, each of them...will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith...such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force...)"

The apparent abandonment by Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, of the principle of "automatic action" in the event of attack on a member of their proposed tripartite alliance substantially increases the probability that the NATO members will give the alliance at least tacit moral approbation. The secretary general of the Greek Foreign Ministry has indicated to the American ambassador in Athens that the North Atlantic Council will be informed of the details of the proposed alliance as soon as the common text has been agreed on by the three principal parties to the alliance. Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia has accepted the principle of liaison between the projected tripartite alliance and NATO, but he has left to Greece and Turkey the task of formulating the details.

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Major items of interest relative to these negotiations include:

- 1. The Greek, Turkish, Yugoslav (Balkan) alliance is being concluded in three phases:
- a. Draft texts of the proposed alliance have been completed by commissions of experts in each of the three countries and were exchanged on 25 June 1954. Provision for "automatic" military action in the event of attack apparently has been abandoned in deference to fears expressed by some NATO countries.
- b. A joint commission of Greek, Turkish, and Yugoslavian experts began sessions in Athens on 28 June to compare the three drafts and prepare a final text.
- 2. "Working level" representatives of the US, UK, and France, meeting in London, have reached a consensus on the following points concerning the proposed alliance:
- a. The North Atlantic Treaty does not contain any absolute prohibition of a military alliance between a $\mathbb{R}\Lambda$ TO member and a non-NATO country.
- b. The North Atlantic Treaty does not give a member the right to veto an alliance negotiated by another member.
- c. A Greek, Turkish, Yugoslav military alliance is inevitable and not likely to be delayed indefinitely.
- d. The Balkan alliance could, depending upon its terms, have the indirect effect of extending NATO commitments.
- e. Development of the terms of alliance should be closely followed with a view to corrective action in the event of any possible conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty or any possible imbalance of obligations, especially relative to NATO implications.

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- f. Greece and Turkey should present alliance plans in the fullest possible detail to the North Atlantic Council sufficiently in advance of signature to give their NATO partners the feeling that their views, if any, will receive friendly consideration.
- 3. The proposed alliance has given rise to the following outstanding problems:
- a. What will be the role of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in the event Greek and Turkish forces already committed to NATO are used to implement the Balkan alliance?
- b. How will the North Atlantic Treaty apply if hostilities are extended to Greece and Turkey as the result of initiative taken by those countries to assist Yugoslavia?
- c. What will be the military and political ties between NATO and the Balkan alliance?
- d. There may be apprehensions over the sincerity of Yugoslavia in any political association with the West and the fear that Yugoslavia may undertake irresponsible action which would precipitate a Balkan crisis. How can these apprehensions be quieted?
- 4. Primary opposition to a Balkan military alliance involving Yugoslavia emanates from:
- a. Italy--for fear that it will strengthen the Yugoslav position in reference to the Trieste issue. Italy has indicated that it might be willing to join the proposed alliance after a settlement of that issue.
- b. Norway and Denmark--for fear that their specific endorsement might be interpreted as approving an extension of NATO's present commitments and for fear that the center of gravity of NATO may shift to the South. Representatives of these countries have expressed the hope that a specific request for NATO approval or endorsement of the proposed alliance will be avoided.

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